Chapter 8 Democratic Transitions
8.1 Overview
Between 1970s-1980s, democratic transions occured:
Portugal, Spain, and Greece experienced transitions to democracy in 1970s.
Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay experienced transitions to democracy in 1980s.
South Korea experienced a transition to democracy in 1980s.
8.2 Mechanism
8.2.1 External imposition
A transition in which external forces impose democracy. 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq has rekindled debate as to whether democracy can be imposed on a country by force. Most studies focusing on U.S. intervention have found that it does not typically lead to democracy.
8.2.1.1 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2006)
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) argue that although leaders of intervening states frequently assert that one of their main goals is to establish democracy, intervention leads to “little if any improvement, and all too often erosion, in the trajectory of democratic development.”
Cheaper for the intervening state to keep a compliant dictator in power than to guarantee that a sympathetic candidate will win democratic elections.
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) examine the impact of military intervention on the level of democratization between 1946 and 2001.
They find that intervention by the UN and by dictatorial states leads to a reduction in democracy. On the other hand, intervention by democracies such as the United States produces the trappings of democracy, such as elections and legislatures. However, it fails to increase the level of democracy to a point that most scholars would consider these countries democratic.
8.2.2 Bottom-up transition
One in which the people rise up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a popular revolution.
Crowds and protests have been important in other transitions to democracy.
Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989
Overthrow of Ceaucescu in Romania in 1989
People Power Revolution that overthrew Marcos in the Philippines in 1986
June Resistance which led to democratic elections in South Korea in 1987
8.2.2.1 Tipping-up model
Start with an individual who must choose whether to publicly support or oppose the dictatorship.
The individual has a private and a public preference.
His private preference is his true attitude toward the dictatorship.
His public preference is the attitude toward the dictatorship that he reveals to the outside world.
It can be dangerous to reveal your opposition to a dictatorship. As a result, individuals who oppose dictatorial rule often falsify their preferences in public.
Although many people engage in preference falsification, there is probably a protest size at which they would be willing to publicly reveal their true preferences.
They might not wish to join a protest of 100 people, but they may be willing to join a protest of 100,000.
Reason: As protests become larger, it becomes harder for dictatorships to monitor and punish each individual.
We’ll refer to the protest size at which an individual is willing to participate as his “revolutionary threshold.”
Individuals naturally have different revolutionary thresholds.
Some people are quite happy to oppose the government irrespective of whether others do (low revolutionary threshold)
Other people may be willing to protest only if lots of others join in (high thresholds).
Some people will actually support the regime and would be extremely unwilling to protest.
- These people have very high thresholds.
Our inability to observe private preferences and revolutionary thresholds conceals potential revolutionary cascades and makes revolutions impossible to predict.
8.3 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) answer a question of why the elite should extend the franchise. Under several assumptions about society, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) construct a formal model to theorize the relationship between inequality and democratization focusing on the dynamics between the rich elite and the poor.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that extending the franchise acted as a commitment to future redistribution and prevented social unrest.
The elite can extend franchise because not to lose everything by a revolution.
The poor can accept the offer of franchise extension (democratization) as a credible commitment.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) shows that the peak of the Kuznets curve occurs right after franchise was extended, which is in line with the model.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explains why the elite would be willing to cede its powers (extend the franchise) even if that means higher taxes levied on them. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provides a new explanation for the Kuznets curve in Western countries.
8.3.1 Top-down transition
8.3.1.1 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986)
Democratic opening is triggered by a split within ruling elites into hard-liners and soft-liners (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
- Hard-liners
the elite group that believes the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable.
- Soft-liners
the group that wants to change the regime, but occupy important positions even after the transition.
Whereas hard-liners tend to be satisfied with the status quo, the soft-liners may prefer to liberalize and broaden the social base of the dictatorship in an attempt to gain allies and to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the hardliners.
The soft-liners must decide whether to open up the political regime through a process of liberalization or to stick with the status quo.
8.3.2 Democratization as an inter-elite relationship
The goal of the liberalization process is NOT to bring about democracy but to incorporate various opposition groups into authoritarian institutions. It is an attempt to co-opt or divide and control opposition groups. The goal is what we might call a broadened dictatorship.
Broadened dictatorships characterized by seemingly democratic institutions such as elections, parties, and legislatures are increasingly common in the world. However, there is growing evidence that broadened dictatorships are not undergoing a prolonged democratic transition.
8.3.2.1 Equilibrium
When an opposition is weak, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (Open, Repress; Enter). The outcome is a broadened dictatorship. Otherwise, when an opposition is strong, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (Do Nothing, Democratize; Organize). The outcome is the status quo.
A transition to democracy is NOT possible as things stand.
This is when we have complete information.
Complete information is when each player knows all the information that there is to know about the game.
8.3.2.2 Ziblatt (2017)
Ziblatt (2017) classifies democratization into two categories; settled democratization and unsettled democratization. He finds the cause of long-run democratic development from understanding the birth of conservative parties. Ziblatt (2017) assumes domestic actors with distinct interests, such as elites and masses. By assumptions, it is possible to pose an argument that authoritarian incumbents need not lead democratization only when they have little choice. Instead, they may strategically lead political reform when they still have the ability to resist it. Ziblatt (2017) introduces a clue how to explain the changes of conservative parties in a new democracy and which strategies the conservative parties can take according to their inherent interests.
8.4 Concepts you should know
bottom-up democratic transition
complete information
hard-liners
preference falsification
soft-liners
third wave of democratization
top-down democratic transition